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USAF'S ROLES IN SPACE SURVEILLANCE
Colonel Robert M. Kronebusch 
Director of Missile and Space Defense
Plans and Programs
Headquarters Aerospace Defense Command 
Colorado Springs, Colorado
ABSTRACT
Currently USAF SPACETRACK supports the U. S. space 
effort in a variety of ways. Space surveillance 
permits space objects to be detected, identified, 
located continuously, analyzed, avoided, monitored 
for status changes, and to have their decay impacts 
predicted. These functions are performed in com­ 
pliance with international agreement and national 
space pol icy. As the U. S. and other nations ven­ 
ture forward in space, new requirements will be 
levied on USAF to defend our space investments. 
The USAF SPACETRACK System is evolving to meet this 
challenge.
INTRODUCTION
Projects MERCURY, GEMINI, APOLLO, VOYAGER, SKYLAB, 
and VIKING are ju^t a few of the exciting space 
projects of the recent past that most people will 
readily recognize. "Live via satellite," is a 
te lev-is ion byline that people have come to take for 
granted. In the future, SPACELAB and flights of 
the shuttle ORBITER, among other projects, will 
elicit profound attention. Meanwhile, quietly be­ 
hind the scenes, the United States Air Force (USAF) 
SPACETRACK System tracks, catalogs, identifies, and 
monitors over 4,600 objects in space; calculates 
whether satellites might collide; predicts where 
reentry debris might fall; and provides various 
amounts and types of data to many government and 
non-government organizations.
THE SPACETRACK SYSTEM
Within the Department of Defense, the Commander in 
Chief, Aerospace Defense Command, has been charged 
with overall space surveillance responsibility. 
The Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) operates USAF 
SPACETRACK, an integrated worldwide single manager
system, and represents Headquarters USAF as the 
operational planning agency for space surveil- 
lance.d) When the USAF SPACETRACK System is cou­ 
pled with other systems, such as the U. S. Navy's 
Space Surveillance System and the Canadian Baker- 
Nunn cameras, the total network is known as the 
Space Detection and Tracking System or SPADATS. 
The SPADAT System which has evolved over the years 
is made up of a wide variety of sensors; some, such 
as the powerful optical Baker-Nunn cameras, are 
dedicated to this mission; others, such as the 
phased array radars and Ballistic Missile Early 
Warning System, play a major role in space object 
tracking while performing the uninterrupted primary 
mission of surveillance for ballistic missile warn­ 
ing. (2) All data from the SPADATS network enters 
the Space Defense Center located inside the North 
American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Cheyenne Moun­ 
tain Complex near Colorado Springs, Colorado. The 
Space Defense Center is a 24 hours-per-day, 7 days- 
per-week operation which processes more than 30,000 
observations daily on the over 4,600 objects in 
orbit. Since SPUTNIK I in 1957, the Space Defense 
Center has cataloged over 11,000 space objects, 
more than half of which have been deorbited'or have 
naturally decayed from orbit.(3)
DOD INTEREST
With the rapid technical evolution of space activ­ 
ity has come a U. S. dependence on space for commu­ 
nications, weather information, attack indications 
and warning, and navigation aids. Future applica­ 
tions, such as the Global Positioning Satellite 
System, will increase this dependence even more. 
Trends in space activity indicate that there is a 
growing awareness of this fact both in the U. S. 
and in other countries. As a result, the evolution 
of space activity over the 21 1/2 years since 
SPUTNIK I has been matched by the development of a 
sophisticated tracking network.
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ORBIT DETERMINATION
A satellite's elliptical orbit is classically de­ 
scribed by six parameters: semimajor axis of the 
ellipse; eccentricity of the ellipse; inclination 
of the orbit with respect to the equatorial plane; 
right ascension; argument of perigee; and true 
anomaly at some epoch time. Any other orbital ele­ 
ments can be defined in terms of this set of six 
independent variables. As can be discerned, a sat- 
ellite ! s position should be precisely defined by 
these orbital elements. This would be true if it 
were not for perturbations due to the earth's 
oblateness, nonuniform gravitational fields, solar 
radiation pressure, and atmospheric drag. In gen­ 
eral, space objects virtually "dance around" in 
their basic orbit due to the effects these anoma­ 
lies have on their motion. Additionally, some of 
these anomalies are difficult to predict. For ex­ 
ample, the atmospheric model In the motion equation 
provides only an estimate of the drag effects be­ 
cause of the uncertainty in solar activity.
For routine studies, general perturbation tech­ 
niques normally provide orbital element set accu­ 
racies on the order of 12 kilometers or less In 
positional error. When extremely accurate results 
are required, special perturbation routines (which 
consider more of the forces that affect sate I Iite 
motion)" can be used. For example, element sets on 
selected satellites in nearly circular 800 kilo­ 
meter altitude orbits can normally be maintained 
with a position error of less than 1 kilometer for 
a three day prediction.
IMPORTANT "ROUTINE" FUNCTIONS
With the magnitude of operation in space surveil­ 
lance, many tasks performed by the Aerospace De­ 
fense Command have become routine. The word "rou­ 
tine," however, must be differentiated from "unim­ 
portant." The importance of ADCOMs routine func­ 
tions can be partially substantiated by.interna­ 
tional agreements. By United Nations agreement, 
the country which launches a satellite is solely 
responsible for any damage resulting from decaying 
satellite debris. Additionally, any recovered ob­ 
jects remain the property of the originating nation 
regardless of impact area. The comprehensive 
SPACETRACK system provides one method of monitoring 
compliance with this treaty. Article 3 of the 1971 
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Out­ 
break of Nuclear War between the U. S. and 
U.S.S.R. requires the parties to undertake to no­ 
tify each other Immediately in the event of uniden­ 
tified objects if such occurrences could create a
risk of outbreak of nuclear war.(4) The Interpre­ 
tation of this Article, of course, is that these 
unidentified objects may appear to the missile 
warning sensor system as incoming ballistic mis­ 
siles. The Space Defense Center catalog, made 
available via the World Data Centers, helps to 
bring many potentially unidentified objects Into 
the identifiable realm. In accordance with a memo­ 
randum of agreement between NORAD and NASAs Goddard 
Space Fl ight Center, the NORAD Space Defense Center 
provides Goddard with data and Information concern­ 
ing U. S. and foreign launches. Goddard, In turn, 
is responsible for the release of unclassified sci­ 
entific and technical Information on space vehicles 
and their behavior. (5)
In addition to routine, surveiI lance and cataloging, 
the Aerospace Defense Command also performs other 
valuable functions. Consider, for a moment, the 
spectacular disaster If a manned mission were to 
collide with another satellite at the velocities of 
space vehicles.
THE SATELLITE COLLISION RISK
The Space Defense Center helps to protect against 
such collisions with a program called COMBO. COMBO 
Is the acronym for Computation of Miss Between Or­ 
bits and Is a program designed to compute the 
points of closest approach between any satellite 
and one or more other satellites. Generally, any 
two satellites in orbit will have two points of 
close approach during each orbital revolution. 
These two points are referred to as relative 
minima, and the smaller of the two Is the absolute 
minimum. The absolute minimum, then, is the clos­ 
est approach between the satellites In question.
The COMBO program can give a motion history and 
path prediction for each satellite for any points 
that fall within a certain specified minimum sepa­ 
ration. The relative minima are determined by com­ 
puting the relative positions at a predetermined 
interval using an orbit representation subroutine. 
When the program recognizes that the distance be­ 
tween the two objects of interest Is near minimum, 
It iterates using a Newton-Raphson technique to de­ 
termine where, in the time interval, the relative 
minimum will actually occur. The data output gives 
satellite positions in various coordinate systems, 
including inertial coordinates, and relative posi­ 
tion and velocity of one satellite with respect to 
the other.(6)
The important consideration in this regard Is that 
COMBO provides a predicted separation distance be-
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tween two predicted satellite positions. The ac­ 
tual accuracy of COMBO, is, therefore, directly re­ 
lated to the accuracy of observations provided by* 
the SPADATS sensors and the accuracy of the orbit 
representation model used. In general, miss dis­ 
tance prediction accuracies have an uncertainty on 
the order of two kilometers under ideal conditions, 
so these data can serve to a I erf of a dangerous 
proximity but cannot definitely predict a colli­ 
sion.
Although the probability of collision between sat­ 
ellites is remote, COMBO is run before and during 
a I I manned missions to provide an extra measure of 
safety for our astronauts in space. As the space 
population continues to grow, the value of COMBO 
also rises.
As pointed out earlier, the space population is in­ 
creasing, but there is also an applicable decay 
rate among satellites. Of the nearly 11,000 ob­ 
jects placed into space since SPUTNIK I, only about 
4,600 remain. The rest have either been intention­ 
ally deorbited, as in recovery of astronaut vehi­ 
cles, or have re-entered the atmosphere in 
classical orbit decay.
DECAY PREDICTIONS
A decay prediction program is used by the Space De­ 
fense Center to forecast the eventual decay of sat- 
ellites in orbit. For decay purposes, we classify 
satellites into two general categories: (1) smal-l 
objects, known as "normal decays," usually less 
than one square meter in size and expected to burn, 
up completely in the earth's atmosphere; and (2) 
larger objects which have a good ohance of surviv­ 
ing reentry to earth impact. We call satellites in 
this second category TIP decays.
TIP is an acronym for Tracking and Impact Predic­ 
tion, a task formally levied on Aerospace Defense 
Command by the Air Force Chief of Staff in 1967.(7) 
The Chief originally called the function Terminal 
Impact Prediction, and although the name has 
evolved to Tracking and Impact Prediction, the 
acronym survived. TIP supports the international 
agreements., mentioned earlier, regarding liability 
for damage caused by debris and measures to prevent 
risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
Normally, thirty days prior to decay, the Space De­ 
fense Center will begin to closely monitor a TIP 
satellite. Before the final prediction is made, 
seven TIP decay messages will be transmitted at es­ 
tablished intervals to various government agencies.
At six and again at two hours prior to decay, the 
Space Defense Center recommends to the NOR/^O Com­ 
mand Post whether or not to report the TIP to the 
National Military Command Center as a "significant 
space event." The criterion for a significant 
space event is simply any TIP satellite whose pre­ 
dicted impact falls within plus or minus 15 minutes 
of the Soviet landmass. Because a satellite pend­ 
ing decay travels approximately 250 nautical miles 
per .minute, the criterion envelope extends 3,750 
nautical miles from the U.S.S.R. When the National 
Military Command Center is advised of a significant 
space event, it, in turn, notifies various agencies 
up to and including the President if certain re­ 
porting criteria are met.
The complexity of TIP prediction can be appreciated 
by briefly analyzing some of the associated limita­ 
tions and technical problems. These fall into the 
following general categories: limitations due to 
sensor locations; atmospheric density model errors; 
satellite altitude changes and the resultant "drag 
effects;" and ballistic re-entry phenomena.
Despite the proliferation of optical and radar sen­ 
sors, the fact remains that we can observe a sateI- 
I ite for only small arcs along its total elliptical 
path. Additionally, all but two of our current 
sensors are in the northern hemisphere; therefore, 
balanced orbit coverage is also not possible. Con­ 
sequently, a TIP satellite could actually go unob­ 
served for five or six hours, a significant limita­ 
tion for an object within a few hours of decay. 
Hence, the ability to predict a satellite's posi- 
"tion when it is not in sensor coverage is vitally 
important. Unfortunately, prediction fs also af­ 
fected by the orbit -determination problems men­ 
tioned earlier.
Because of these limitations, impact prediction is 
not an exact science. Therefore, a credence or 
confidence window is assigned to each TIP predic­ 
tion. Confidence in decay prediction is defined as 
plus or minus 20 percent of the elapsed time be­ 
tween the last sensor observation and the predicted 
time of decay. Because of the limited number of 
sensors, this figure has historically translated to 
an average window of plus or minute 5,700 nautical 
miles. Even if we consider the best possible case 
for the two hour prediction (i.e., a sensor obser­ 
vation exactly two hours before the predicted 
decay), the best confidence window that could be 
associated with this is 20? of two hours, or plus 
or minus 24 minutes, which translates to about 
12,000 nautical miles along the satellite's course 
of travel.
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To complicate this situation, unpredictable anom­ 
alies can occur which drastically change a satel­ 
lited decay. For example, in one actual case, the 
satellite "skipped" off the upper reaches of the 
atmosphere and remained in orbit for one and a half 
revolutions beyond the two-hour predicted decay 
point. An opposite effect is seen when a stable 
satellite suddenly becomes unstable and commences 
to tumble as it impinges upon the atmosphere in 
which case it is very likely to decay earlier than 
pred icted.
To focus on these aspects of the TIP program, let ! s 
consider what is, to date, the decay that has at­ 
tracted the greatest public attention: the decay 
of the Soviet COSMOS 954 and its impact in Canada.
COSMOS 954
Space Detection and Tracking System sensors ob­ 
served the degenerating orbit of COSMOS 954 during 
October and November of 1977, and original calcula­ 
tions produced a decay date in mid-April 1978. 
These predictions persisted as late as January 4, 
1978, when the Space Defense Center analysts still 
predicted an April re-entry. They did, however, 
caveat their prediction with, "If it remains 
stable." Two days later, the stability criterion 
was violated—COSMOS 954 had begun tumbling at 
about one-quarter revolution per minute. Histori­ 
cally, re-entry of near earth satellites occurs be­ 
tween two and five weeks after the onset of tumble.
An average TIP satellite requires about 20 computer 
runs or about five hours of computation time. 
COSMOS 954 was averaging three times normal due to 
high national interest.
On January 21, the prediction was for a 40 hour 
confidence window spanning January 24 and 25. Two 
days later, the prediction was for 7:55AM Eastern 
Standard Time (EST) on the 24th. Although this 
prediction eventually proved to be "right on," the 
plus or minus 10 hour confidence window left con­ 
siderable uncertainty as to impact location.
One day before re-entry, the decay prediction time 
was plus or minus five hours from 10:03 /W EST on 
the 24th. At 10 hours prior to decay, the predic­ 
tion was for 8:43 AM EST on the 24th, plus or minus 
three hours. The six and two hour predictions 
showed a 95? probability that if the debris struck 
a landmass, it would not be the Soviet Union. The 
decay of COSMOS 954 did not meet the previously 
mentioned criteria for a significant space event.
The final prediction came after the fact and 
chiefly as a result of visual sighting and data 
from a Hawaiian site; 7:56 AM EST plus or minus 
three minutes; area indicated—Great Slave Lake in 
Canada.
As stated earlier, sensor coverage Is one limita­ 
tion of the SPADATS system that affects our TIP 
capability. For COSMOS 954s last nine hours of 
flight, only 25 minutes of observational data was 
obtained. That is, sensors "saw" only 4.8 percent 
of the last nine hours flight path—everything else 
was prediction.
SKYLAB
The preceding figures may give some Insight into 
the concern over the decay and re-entry of SKYLAB 
later this year. While probability favors an Insig­ 
nificant impact into the ocean, "the Aerospace De­ 
fense Command will apply more man hours and more 
computer time to TIP predictions for SKYLAB than 
for any previous decay. Data sharing with other 
agencies will jump from routine to maximum.
SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCIES
Routine data sharing and support to other agencies 
by Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) Is handled by 
the NORAD Combat Operations Center Technical and 
Data Support Division. This is the single point of 
contact for SPADATS requests from all agencies In­ 
volved in DOD activities. Support requests from 
civilian scientific organizations are made via 
NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center. NASA/ADCOM In­ 
terface is via the Aeronautics ar>d Astronautics Co­ 
ordinating Board, a highly effective means of maxi­ 
mizing the benefits derived from NASA programs for 
defense use, and, in turn, assuring that the tech­ 
nology developed in military programs is available 
for civil applications.
CONCLUSION
The USAF SPACETRACK System, as an Integrated world­ 
wide single manager system, will continue to be an 
active partner In the overalI U. S. space program. 
Looking ahead, Aerospace Defense Command Is cur­ 
rently planning and programming additional radar 
and optical sensors to add to the SPADATS network 
and to decrease some of the I Imitations pointed out 
in this discussion. Economic constraints prevent 
us from ever having sufficient ground-based sensors 
to see a sate I I Ite everywhere in Its orbit; how-
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ever, long-range future plans put state-of-the-art 
sensor technology on satellites in deep space. 
This space-based system will have an unrestricted 
view of all objects in earth orbit and a down-link 
data system to what will by then be the Space 
Operations Center (a planned evolution of the Space 
Defense Center). And, this future system will 
continue the mission precedent established by the 
present system, monitoring activities in space to 
help preserve the use of outer space by all nations 
for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of man­ 
kind.(9)
APPENDIX
Satellite Control Facility, other AFETR tracking 
radars, and NASA tracking and detection sensors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The SPADATS Sensors: (10)
Dedicated sensors—NORAD/ADCOM assigned sensors 
whose primary mission is satellite detection and 
tracking :
- Edwards Air Force Base, California: Baker-Nunn 
camera
- Pulmosan, Korea: Baker-Nunn camera
- San Vito, Italy: Baker-Nunn camera
- Mt John, New Zealand: Baker-Nunn camera
- The Navy Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR): 
a radiometric interferometer consisting of trans­ 
mitters and receivers across the width of the U. S. 
at the 33rd parallel.
Collateral sensors—ADCOM assigned sensors whose 
primary mission is other than SPACETRACK:
- Ballistic Missile Early Warning System: detec­ 
tion and tracking radars at Thule, Greenland; 
Clear,.Alaska; and Fylingdales, England (Royal Air 
Force).
- Shemya, Aleutian Islands, Alaska: phased array 
radar.
- Eg I in Air Force Base, Florida: phased array 
radar.
- Concrete, North Dakota: phased array radar.
Contributing sensors—those sensors not assigned to 
ADCOM which provide SPACETRACK data to ADCOM:
- Millstone Hill, Massachusetts: Lincoln Labora­ 
tory deep space tracking radar.
- Ascension Island and Antigua Island: Air Force 
Eastern Test Range (AFETR) tracking radars.
- Maui, Hawaii: electro-optical sensor.
- Socorro, New Mexico: active test station, opti­ 
cal sensor.
- Kwajalein Atoll: Air Force Western Test Range 
Tracking radars.
- Part-time contributors, including the Air Force
The author gratefully acknowledges information and 
assistance provided by the NORAD Space Defense Cen­ 
ter; the Space Defense Activity Branch, Systems 
Control and Configuration Division, Headquarters 
Aerospace Defense Command; and by other highly pro­ 
fessional Headquarters Aerospace Defense Command 
personnel, too numerous to mention.
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